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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Alabama’s legislative redistricting plans
unconstitutionally classify black voters by race by
intentionally packing them in districts designed to
maintain supermajority percentages produced when
2010 census data are applied to the 2001 majority-
black districts.
ii
PARTIES
The plaintiffs in this action are the Alabama
Legislative Black Caucus, the Alabama Association
of Black County Officials, Bobby Singleton, Fred
Armstead, George Bowman, Rhondel Rhone, Albert F.
Turner, Jr., and Jiles Williams, Jr. The defendants are
the State of Alabama and Jim Bennett, Alabama
Secretary of State. The intervenor-defendants are
state Senator Gerald Dial and state Representative
Jim McClendon.
In Alabama Democratic Conference v. State of
Alabama, No. 13-1138, the plaintiffs are the Alabama
Democratic Conference, Demetrius Newton (deceased),
Framon Weaver, Sr., Stacey Stallworth, Rosa Toussaint,
and Lynn Pettway. The defendants are the State of
Alabama, Robert J. Bentley, Governor of Alabama,
and Jim Bennett, Alabama Secretary of State. The
intervenor-defendants are state Senator Gerald Dial
and state Representative Jim McClendon.
ooo
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OPINIONS BELOW
The December 20, 2013 opinion of the district
court, which is reported at 989 F.Supp.2d 1227 (M.D.
Ala. 2013), is set out at J.S.App. 1-275. The August 2,
2013 opinion of the district court, which is reported at
988 F.Supp.2d 1285 (M.D. Ala. 2013), is set out at
J.S.App. 278-407. The April 5, 2013, opinion of the
district court, which is unofficially reported at 2013
WL 1397139 (M.D. Ala. April 5, 2013), reconsidera-
tion denied 988 F.Supp.2d 1285 (M.D. Ala. 2013), is
set out at J.S.App. 408-36. The December 26, 2012,
opinion of the district court, which is unofficially re-
ported at 2012 WL 6706665 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 26, 2012),
is set out at J.S.App. 437-53.
JURISDICTION
The final judgment denying all claims in these
consolidated actions was entered on December 20,
2013. J.S.App. 276-77. The Alabama Legislative Black
Caucus plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on Janu-
ary 6, 2014. J.S.App. 454-57. The jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. This Court
noted probable jurisdiction on June 2, 2014.
2STATUTES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED
The statutes and constitutional provision in-
volved are set out in an appendix to the brief.
STATEMENT
For much of the twentieth century there were no
blacks in the Alabama Legislature. The first black
members of the Alabama House in the modern era
were elected in 1970, and the first black Senators in
1974. The number and boundaries of majority-black
legislative districts have been a matter of controversy
in Alabama throughout the ensuing decades.
Following the 1990 census, the Legislature failed
to redistrict itself; new districts were ordered into
effect by an Alabama court in 1993. See Brooks v.
Hobbie, 631 So.2d 883, 884 (Ala. 1993). Under the
1993 court-ordered plan, there were 27 majority-black
House districts ("HD") and 8 majority-black Senate
districts ("SD"). Most of those districts had a total
black population between 60% and 70% black.
J.S.App. 47. The lowest black population was in HD
85, which was 51.13% black. In elections under the
1993 plan, black candidates were successful in all of
these majority-black districts, including HD 85. Since
1993, candidates supported by black voters have been
elected in all majority-black districts in Alabama.
Most but not all of those successful candidates have
been black; there are currently two white members of
3the Alabama Legislature elected in majority-black
districts.
The 2000 census revealed that the majority-black
districts were all underpopulated.1 Population shifts
had reduced the total population in many of those
districts,2 and others had not grown as fast as the rest
of the state. The Alabama Legislature, at that time
controlled by Democrats, adopted a redistricting plan.
Under that plan the black population percentage was
reduced in all of the majority-black Senate districts,
and in 22 of the 27 majority-black House districts.3
The 2001 plan reduced the average black population
percentage4 by 6.19% in the majority-black Senate
districts and 5.05% in the majority-black House
districts.5 The largest reductions were in HD 57
(reduced by 19.648%) and HD 82 (reduced by
16.163%). HD 85 was reduced from 53.3% to 47.9% and
SD 28 was reduced from 59.269% to 56.458%. The
2001 plan also created a new majority-black district,
HD 84, which was only 52.4% black. J.S.App. 21-23.
The black members of the legislature supported the
plan, even though it substantially reduced the size of
1 State Defendants’ Exhibit ("SDX") 407,441.
2 Compare SDX 407 and 411 with SDX 402 and 406.
3 SDX 407, 411; Brief Appendix, pp. 8a-10a.
4 We refer to the amount of change in the percentage of the
black population by calculating the difference between the per-
centages under two plans, rather than by calculating the ratio,
in percent, between the two percentages.
~ See Brief Appendix pp. 8a-10a.
4the black majorities in the all the Senate districts and
almost all of the House districts. The state submitted
these changes to the Department of Justice for pre-
clearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
The Department did not object to these reductions in
the size of the black majorities in any of the affected
districts. See Montiel v. Davis, 215 F.Supp.2d 1279,
1289 (S.D. Ala. 2002) (three-judge court) (Black, J.,
concurring).
Black candidates continued to be elected from
HD 85 under the 2001 plan, even though now it was
only a black-plurality district.6 Candidates supported
by black voters were also elected from HD 84 and SD
28, even though in both the black population was less
than 60%, and actually declined over the next ten
years.7 During the decade following enactment of
the 2001 plan, the black population fell below 60% in
five other House " " 8districts, and in a Senate district.~
Candidates supported by the black voters nonetheless
continued to win the elections in those districts. In
HD 73, originally majority-white, the black population
grew substantially; by 2010 HD 73 was a plurality-
black district, with a population 48.55% black. APX 6;
6 Doc. 125o4, Alabama Legislative Black Caucus Exhibit
("APX’) 67, McClendon dep., 121.
7 By the 2010 census, HD 84 was only 50.67% black and SD
28 was only 51.05% black. APX 6; APX 7; J.A. 103-08.
8APX 6; J.A. 103-08 (House districts 32 (59.62%), 53
(55.71c~), 54 (56.77%), 82 (57.18%) and 83 (57.03%)).
9 APX 7; J.A. 107-08 (Senate district 18 (59.93%)).
5J.A. 105. In 2010 the candidate supported by black
voters in HD 73 defeated the incumbent in the gen-
eral election.1°
The 2010 census1~ revealed that the majority-
black districts were all underpopulated. This was due
to a decline in the population in some districts, and
slow growth of the population in others.~2 The majority-
black Senate districts on average were underpopulat-
ed by about 15%, and the average majority-black
House district was underpopulated by about 16%.
J.S.App. 47-48.~3 The minimum number of additional
people who would have to be added to each district
turned in part on how much the Legislature decided
to permit a district to depart from the ideal size. In
10 Newton Plaintiffs’ (Alabama Democratic Conference)
Exhibit ("NPX") 324 at 25; Tr. v. 3, at 39.
11 There is a minor difference in the manner in which the
Department of Justice and certain Alabama calculations in this
case determined from the 2010 census whether to treat an in-
dividual as black, due to several subcategories in the census
data. Those differences are not material to the resolution of this
case, but they give rise to some minor discrepancies in the data.
12 The majority opinion suggests that these districts were
underpopulated in 2010 largely if not exclusively because in
2001 the Democratic controlled Legislature had deliberately un-
derpopulated these districts as part of a partisan gerrymander.
J.S.App. 4-7, 18-20. Whatever the motives of the 2001 Legisla-
ture, its plan clearly was not the primary cause of the under-
population that existed by the 2010 census. Under the 2001
plan, the average majority-black district was underpopulated by
less than 2.5%. See J.S.App. 54-56.
13 The average underpopulation can be calculated from the
tables on these pages.
6prior redistricting, Alabama had required districts to
be within 5% of the size of an ideal district. In design-
ing the post-2010 census districting plan, however,
the framers decided instead to permit a deviation of
only 1%. That decision significantly increased the
number of additional individuals who would have to
be added to an underpopulated district. To bring the
majority-black districts to within 1% of the ideal size,
the new districting plan had to add about 20,000
persons to the average majority-black Senate district
and about 6,000 persons to the average majority-
black House district. The central controversy in this
appeal concerns the method that was used by the
Alabama Legislature in selecting the individuals to
be moved into the majority-black districts.
In 2012 the Legislature was now controlled by
the Republicans, who had supermajorities in both the
House and Senate. The framers of the 2012 district-
ing plan chose to deal with the need to repopulate the
majority-black districts in a manner very different
from that used by the framers of the 2001 plan. In
selecting the persons to be added to those majority-
black districts, the 2012 plan - through a variety of
stratagems described below - ensured that about 64%
of those added to the majority-black districts would
be black,14 even though the total Alabama population
outside those districts - the pool from which those
See nn.16, 17, infra.
individuals was drawn - was only about 17% black.15
In repopulating SD 26, the 2012 plan added 14,806
blacks and 36 whites. Over 121,000 blacksTM were
added to the majority-black House districts, about
20% of all blacks in Alabama who did not already live
in a majority-black House district.17 Over 105,000
blacksTM were added to the majority-black Senate
15 Using the Senate figures described in n.18, infra, the 27
Senate districts that were not majority black had a total popula-
tion of 3,856,004, of which 656,307 were black.
1~ APX 6 contains total and black populations for all the
House districts. It sets out the total and black populations of 26
districts with a black voting age population in 2001; these omit
HD 84, which only had a black voting age population plurality.
When the data for HD 84 are added to the totals for the 2001
plan, those totals then refer to the same 27 majority-black
districts in the totals for the 2012 plan. The 2012 plan increased
the sum population of those 27 districts by 191,659, of which
121,790 (63.5%) were black. The numbers for both would be
slightly higher if HD 85, which went from plurality-black to
majority-black, were included.
17 The 2012 plan added to the 27 majority-black House
districts 121,790 of the 594,151 blacks who were not then living
in those districts.
18 APX 7 contains total and black populations for all the
Senate districts. It sets out the total and black populations of 7
districts with a black voting age population in 2001; these omit
SD 28, which only had a black voting age population plurality.
When the data for SD 28 are added to the totals for the 2001
plan, those totals then refer to the same 8 majority-black
districts in the totals for the 2012 plan. The 2012 plan increased
the sum population of those 8 districts by 165,591, of which
107,298 (65.2%) were black.
8districts, about 16% of all blacks who previously had
been in other districts.~9 See J.S.App. 195-98, 231-
32.2°
In a majority of the new districts, the black
population percentage actually went up compared to
the population under the 2010 census in the 2001
plan districts. See Brief Appendix, pp. 5a-7a, infra.
HD 59 rose from 67.04% black to 76.8% black. SD 33
increased from 64.89% black to 71.1% black. SD 28
increased from 51.05% black to 59.96% black. J.A. 17.
The 2012 plan raised the percentage of the black
population in many of the very districts whose black
population percentage had been lowered by the 2001
plan.21
1.~ The 2012 plan added to the 8 majority-black Senate
districts 105,298 blacks out of 656,307 who prior to that plan
were not living in majority-black districts.
20 In this portion of his opinion the dissenting judge de-
scribes the number of blacks who would have had to be added to
the majority-black House and Senate districts if all of them had
been 1% below the size of an ideal House and Senate district. All
of those districts were somewhat larger than that.
21 HD 59, lowered by 3.0% in 2001, was increased by 9.76%
in 2012. HD 72, which was decreased by 17.16% in 2001, was
increased by 5.02% in 2012. HD 72, which was decreased by
3.91% in 2001, was increased by 4.38% in 2012. HD 76, which
was decreased by 4.44% in 2001, was increased by 4.34% in
2012.
9Conversely, in 8 of the 11 districts in which blacks
had been between 30% and 50% of the population, the
plan reduced the black population to below 30%.2~
House and Senate Districts 30% to 50% Black:
Eliminated by the 2012 Plan23
District 2001 Plan 2012 Plan
HD 73 48.55% 10.5%
HD 45 36.01% 15.5%
SD 11 34.24% 15.30%
SD 7 32.49% 27.68%
HD 6 30.75% 16.9%
HD 61 30.58% 19.1%
HD 74 30.55% 24.7%
HD 38 30.24% 16.9%
Every black member of the Alabama Legislature
voted against adoption of the 2012 plan.24 Several had
expressed concern at earlier hearings that the Re-
publican majority might fashion a plan that packed
blacks into the existing majority-black districts.~5
22 "The district court expressly found that the need to equal-
ize population and maintain the population of adjacent majority-
black districts necessarily changed these ’opportunity’ districts."
Joint Motion to Affirm, No. 13-1138, 14.
2~ APX 6 andAPX 7; J.A. 103-08.
~ NPX 323 (Arrington) at Table 6.
2~ Doc. 30-25 (SDX 441) at 8-9 (Rep. England), Doc. 30-28
(SDX 444) (Sen. Sanders, Rep. Melton), Doc. 30-12 (SDX 433) at
(Continued on following page)
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After a draft of the 2012 plan was made public,
individual black Representatives and Senators of-
fered alternative plans that had lower black popu-
lations in the districts.26 Those proposals were all
rejected; the framers of the 2012 plan candidly testi-
fied that they would not accept these proposals be-
cause they did not add enough blacks to the districts
in question.27 See J.S.App. 206. The black state Sena-
tor from Mobile expressly asked that the population
to be added to her district come from white areas,
insisting that she could and indeed wanted to repre-
sent white voters.28 Her request, too, was rejected; the
2012 plan instead increased the proportion of blacks
in her district.~9
This action was commenced in 2012 by the Ala-
bama Legislative Black Caucus, the Alabama Associ-
ation of Black County Officials, one black Senator
and five black members of county commissions. A
6 (Rep. Scott), 8-9 (Rep. Coleman), Doc. 30-30 (SDX 466) at 25-
27 (Rep. Coleman).
~6 See APX 20-23.
27 Tr. v. 1, 75, 124, 133; Dial. dep., Doc. 125-3, APX 66, at 38-
39.
2s Tr. v. 2, at 46 ("on the floor of the senate .... [a]s we
started debating, and I saw the percentages in my district, I
asked for more white voters. I said I was very capable of repre-
senting white people. And they said that they couldn’t go one
way or the other. So I said, well, why can’t you go ... over the
bay to Baldwin County? But one of the senators from that area
didn’t want me in their local delegation.").
29 Senator Figures represents SD 33.
11
subsequent action was filed on behalf of the Alabama
Democratic Conference and other individuals. Both
proceedings were brought against the state of Ala-
bama and one or more state officials. Because the
complaints challenged the validity of a state district-
ing plan, it was heard by a three-judge court. 28
U.S.C. § 2284. The Republican co-chairs of the Legis-
lature’s Redistricting Committee, Senator Gerald Dial
and Representative Jim McClendon, intervened as
defendants.
The complaints initially asserted two race-
related claims. First, they alleged that the 2012 plan
was adopted for the intentionally discriminatory
purpose of diluting black votes, by packing black
voters into the existing majority-black districts, in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Second, the complaints con-
tended that the 2012 plan had the effect of diluting
black votes, in violation of section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
In June of 2013 the plaintiffs took the deposi-
tion of Randy Hinaman, the political consultant
who, working with Senator Dial and Representative
McClendon, had created the disputed 2012 plan.
Hinaman candidly explained that the framers of the
2012 plan had expressly sought whenever possible to
fix the percentage of the black population in each
district at a level no lower than it was in the 2001
districts after the 2010 census. Achieving that result
required that the areas added to each district contain
at least the same black percentage as the district to
12
which it was being joined. Hinaman insisted that
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act required that the
state redistrict in this manner. In the wake of
Hinaman’s deposition, the plaintiffs expanded their
claims to include an argument that the 2012 plan was
a racial gerrymander that violated Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630 (1993) ("Shaw I").
Depositions of Dial and McClendon confirmed
Hinaman’s account of how the 2012 plan had been
crafted; Dial and McClendon explained they had
repopulated the majority-black districts in this man-
ner because they believed they were required to do so
by section 5. These accounts delineated four specific
tactics that the framers had used to attempt to assure
that each of the majority-black districts would have
at least the black population percentage that existed
under the 2001 lines after the 2010 census. First, in
Montgomery County they dismembered HD 73 - the
black plurality district - and used portions of it to
add to the neighboring majority-black districts. As
Hinaman put it, "District 73 was cannibalized if you
will to repopulate [HDs] 77, 78, and 76.’’’~° See pp. 39-
40, infra. Second, they cannibalized a majority-black
district, HD 53, and used various parts of that district
to add blacks to the eight remaining majority-black
districts in Jefferson County.~1 See p. 38, infra. Third,
3o Doc. 134-4, APX 75, at 142.
31 To avoid reducing the number of majority-black districts,
the 2012 plan created a new majority-black district in Madison
Continued on following page)
13
in deciding which areas to add to each majority-black
district, Hinaman selected particular areas, precincts
or census blocks so that the resulting district would,
if possible, have a black population no lower in per-
centage than the 2001 district had after the 2010
census. Where necessary to achieve that result,
Hinaman had extended districts into other counties
and divided precincts on racial lines. See pp. 41-49,
infra. Fourth, in at least one instance Hinaman
removed white areas from an underpopulated majority-
black district so that they could be replaced by black
neighborhoods. See pp. 51-53, infra.
The case was tried before the three-judge court in
August 2013. Regarding the plaintiffs’ Shaw claims,
there were no significant disputes about the manner
in which Hinaman, Dial and McClendon had framed
the 2012 plan. All three maintained that in light of
section 5 they were obligated to replicate in the new
districts, where possible, the same black population
percentages that existed in the 2001 districts after
the 2010 census. They gave similar accounts both of
that purpose of the 2012 plan and of the specific race-
conscious steps they had taken to assure that result.
In the district court, the central issue was whether
under this Court’s decision in Shaw and its progeny
those largely undisputed facts required strict scrutiny
of the 2012 plan, and if so whether the state’s race-
conscious action could withstand strict scrutiny
County, which was then assigned the number, HD 53, of the
cannibalized district.
14
because it was required by section 5. Those remain
the controlling legal issues in this Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
(1) In 2012 Alabama redistricted its House and
Senate in a manner that systematically transferred
into the state’s majority-black districts a signifi-
cant portion of the black population which previously
had been in majority-white districts. Approximately
122,000 blacks were moved into the existing majority-
black House districts, representing about 20% of the
state’s black population that had been in white dis-
tricts. Over 108,000 blacks were transferred into
existing majority-black Senate districts. The redis-
tricting increased the population of one House Dis-
trict by 14,806 blacks and only 36 whites. All of the
black members of the Alabama Legislature voted
against the plan.
The facts regarding the motives of the Legisla-
ture and the manner in which this large number of
blacks was packed into already existing majority-
black districts are largely undisputed. The district
court erred in concluding that those facts did not
constitute a violation of the Equal Protection princi-
ples articulated in Shaw v. Reno and its progeny.
(2) The central feature of the redistricting plan
was the implementation of district-specific racial
ratios to determine who would be added to each
majority-black district. In the wake of the 2010
15
census, the majority-black House and Senate districts
were all underpopulated, and substantial additional
populations had to be added to each of those districts.
The state decided that the black proportion of the
population added to each majority-black district
should equal or exceed the racial composition of the
district in question under the 2001 plan after the
2010 census. The racial ratios thus determined varied
from about 51% in one district to over 70% in several
others.
The district court itself found, and the framers of
the 2012 plan acknowledged, that the framers in-
tended to "maintain the same relative percentages of
black populations in the majority-black districts."
Those state officials insisted they believed that sec-
tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act required them to match
the black population percentage in each majority-
black district. The Legislature’s written Guidelines
directed that compliance with the Voting Rights Act
be given "priority" over all traditional districting
principles. Thus the achievement of the district-
specific racial ratios was by definition the predomi-
nant purpose of the plan, the circumstance that
establishes a Shaw claim.
The district court erred in holding that the pre-
dominant purpose of the plan was instead compliance
with the constitutional requirement of one person,
one vote. Shaw claims usually arise in the context of
districts that are sufficiently similar in size that
they present no separate constitutional issue under
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). If deliberate
16
compliance with one person, one vote could defeat a
Shaw claim, Shaw would be virtually a dead letter.
This Court has repeatedly found liability for a Shaw
violation in cases where none of the districts was
unconstitutionally malapportioned.
(3) Alabama implemented the district-specific
minimum racial ratios with exactitude. In 13 of the
House districts the black population percentage of the
new district was within 0.71% of- and always above
- the percentage in the old district under the 2010
census. In 7 of those districts the black population
percentage was less than 0.1% higher than in the old
district. That pattern was "unexplainable on grounds
other than race." Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541,
546 (1999).
The state subordinated a number of important
traditional districting principles to the requirement
of achieving the district-specific minimum racial
ratios. The Legislature’s Guidelines identified keep-
ing incumbents in separate districts, and preserving
existing districts, as longstanding state districting
principles. But the redistricting plan cannibalized
two districts - one majority-black and one plurality-
black - for the avowed purpose of distributing their
black populations to other districts in order to meet
the applicable racial ratios in the surviving districts.
Abolition of those districts necessarily meant that
their incumbent Representatives were placed in the
same districts as other incumbents.
17
The Guidelines also directed that each House and
Senate district should be composed of as few counties
as possible. In Alabama redistricting that does not
cross county lines is a matter of constitutional im-
portance, because the state Constitution requires ap-
portioning House and Senate seats among whole
counties, and because county legislative delegations
control all local laws for their respective counties.
There was undisputed evidence that the framers of
the 2012 plan, in order to achieve the racial ratios,
repeatedly crafted districts that crossed county lines.
(4) The district court erred in holding that sec-
tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires a covered
jurisdiction to maintain the minority population per-
centage of every majority-minority district. A reduc-
tion in that percentage will not always affect the
ability of members of a protected group to elect their
preferred candidates of choice. The minority popula-
tion in a district might be so high that a reduction
would have no practical consequences.
The Department of Justice, which administers
section 5, has maintained both before and after the
2006 amendments that whether a districting plan is
retrogressive depends on a number of circumstances
in addition to the change in the minority population
percentage.
18
ARGUMENT
I. ACHIEVING THE DISTRICT-SPECIFIC MIN-
IMUM RACIAL RATIOS WAS THE PRE-
DOMINANT PURPOSE OF THE REDRAWN
MAJORITY-BLACK DISTRICT LINES
A. The Governing Legal Standard
In a series of decisions beginning with Shaw v.
Reno, this Court has recognized an Equal Protection
claim where racial considerations were the "predomio
nant" purpose of a district’s boundaries or of a dis-
tricting plan. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243
(2001) (controlling issue is whether "race ... predomi-
nantly explains [the district’s] boundaries") (emphasis
in original); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 547
(1999) ("in this context, strict scrutiny applies if race
was the ’predominant factor’ motivating the legisla-
ture’s districting decision"); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952, 959 (plurality opinion), 996 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring) ("ample evidence ... demonstrates the pre-
dominance of race in Texas’ redistricting") (1996);
Shaw v. Hunt ("Shaw I/"), 517 U.S. 899, 905, 907
(1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995)
("[t]he plaintiff’s burden is to show ... that race was
the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s
decision to place a significant number of voters within
or without a particular district"); Shaw v. Reno,
supra. Proof of such predominance serves two func-
tions which inform the meaning of this element of a
Shaw claim.
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First, proof that race was the predominant pur-
pose of a legislative district is necessary to establish a
violation of the Equal Protection right recognized in
Shaw. This Court has repeatedly explained that a
Shaw claim requires more than proof that race was a
consideration behind a redistricting plan. Easley, 532
U.S. at 241 (majority opinion), 266 n.8 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). "The constitutional wrong occurs when
race becomes the ’dominant and controlling’ consider-
ation." Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 905 (quoting Miller, 515
U.S. at 911, 915-16)). A Shaw claim is "analytically
distinct," for example, from a claim that a districting
scheme "has the purpose and effect of diluting racial
group’s voting strength." Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 649,
652.3~ In non-Shaw Equal Protection cases, the initial
burden on a plaintiff is only to show that race was "a
motivating factor," Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd.
of Education v. Doyle, 319 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Shaw
requires more.
Second, Shaw holds that proof of a predominant
racial motive establishes a cognizable injury that
gives rise to standing. Outside of the context of a
dilution claim, demonstrating the existence of indi-
vidualized harm resulting from a districting plan may
be hard, because "it will frequently be difficult to
discern why a particular citizen was put in one dis-
trict or another." United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737,
744 (1995). A plaintiff could not establish a cognizable
32 E.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-17 (1982); White
v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-666 (1973).
2O
personal injury merely by showing that someone else
had been added to (or removed from) his or her dis-
trict on the basis of race.33 But a districting plan
whose predominant purpose is racial threatens
distinct representational harms cognizable under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Hays, 515 U.S. at 745; Shaw
I, 509 U.S. at 648, 650.
Miller made clear that Shaw claims are not lim-
ited to districts which have a bizarre shape. "Shape
is relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary
element of the constitutional wrong or a threshold
requirement of proof, but because it may be persua-
sive circumstantial evidence that race for its own
sake, and not other districting principles, was the
legislature’s dominant and controlling rationale in
drawing its district lines." Miller, 515 U.S. at 913.
A plaintiff may establish the existence of such a
predominant motive with other types of evidence. Id.
In the previous Shaw cases considered by this
Court, there was often a dispute of fact as to whether
the legislature at issue had considered race at all in
crafting the districts in dispute. This case is different
and simpler. The motives of the framers of the 2012
plan were candidly disclosed; the issue here is only
33 The deliberate creation of a majority-white or majority-
black district would not, without more, bring about the type of
cognizable injury recognized in Shaw. Absent a Shaw claim, a
plaintiff challenging such a district would have to show some
other type of injury, such as vote dilution.
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whether those acknowledged purposes, and the ac-
tions to which they led, satisfy the predominance
standard.
B. The Avowed Racial Purpose of The 2012
Plan
(1) The district court recognized the racial stan-
dard utilized by the Alabama Legislature in de-
termining which persons should be added to the
majority-black districts to increase their total popu-
lation levels to within 1% of the ideal district size.
Here, unlike in Easley, the state does not contend
that the district lines were fashioned for partisan
rather than racial reasons. To the contrary, state
officials acknowledged, and the district court found,
that the areas to be added to each majority-black
district were selected to ensure that the black per-
centage in that district was at least as high as it had
been in the 2001 district under the 2010 census. State
officials maintained that section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act required them to redistrict in that race-
conscious manner, and the state’s own guidelines
mandated that the Voting Rights Act - thus inter-
preted - be given priority over all traditional district-
ing principles, subject only to the requirement of one
person, one vote.
The district court concluded that "[t]he Legislature
preserved, where feasible, the existing majority-black
districts and maintained the relative percentages
of black voters in those majority-black districts."
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J.S.App. 181-82 (emphasis added). The court pointed
out that both Hinaman and Dial had described in
that way the standard they used in drafting the plan.
J.S.App. 100 (Dial testified that "the Committee tried
to match the percentages of the total black population
in majority-black districts to the percentages in the
2001 districts based on the 2010 census."), 151
("Hinaman ... added enough contiguous black popu-
lations to maintain the same relative percentages of
black populations in the majority-black districts.").
Dial explained that "We wanted to make sure
[the majority-black districts] stayed as they were and
... that they grew into the same proportion of minori-
ties that they originally had or as close to it as we
could get it.’’’~4 Hinaman agreed that "when it came to
the percentages of an individual district, I wanted to
get as close as possible or try to be as close as possible
34 Dial dep., APX 66, Doc. 125-3, at 17; see id. at 100 ("Q ....
[Y]ou wanted to make sure that the percentage of total popula-
tion of African-Americans in [the majority-black Senate dis-
tricts] stayed the same? A. As close to it as possible"); tr. v. 1 at
54 ("Q. And to be clear, the retrogression standard that you
applied required ... that you maintain the black majority
percentage, the level, the size of the black majorities, in those
districts; is that correct? A. Yes, sir."), 79 ("if they grew in by
population, they had to grow in the same percentage that they
already have and not regress that district"), 94 ("Q. You’ve
testified about how you were unwilling to lower the minority
percentage in any district to avoid your view of what regressing
was, retrogressing. A. That’s correct."), 133 ("the minority dis-
tricts ... had to grow ... in the same proportion of minorities
that they already had.").
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to the numbers that existed with the 2010 census put
into the 2002 [sic] ma[p]."35 McClendon explained that
"we tried to look at the 2010 census, overlay it on the
districts, and try not to change the percentages of the
citizens, the black citizens.’’3~ In its motion to affirm
in No. 13-1138, the state stated that "one of the Leg-
islature’s overall goals was to ’make sure that each
black-majority district ... maintained its prior per-
centage of black population.’ J.S. 18." (ADC Joint
Motion to Affirm, at 20) (emphasis in original). At
trial the state objected that plaintiffs’ proposals to
create an additional majority-black district would not
"maintain prior population portions in minority dis-
tricts.’’~7 This Court noted in Hunt v. Cromartie that
"[o]utright admissions of impermissible racial motiva-
tions are infrequent .... " 526 U.S. at 553. The state, to
be sure, insists these racial motives were permissible;
but their existence is uncontroverted.
The state sought to justify this systemic use of
race by insisting that it was required by section 5 of
35 Hinaman dep., APX 75, Doc. 134-4, at 101; see id. tr. v. 3,
118 ("I tried where possible not to lower the total population of
African American population in those minority majority dis-
tricts"), 145 ("And then looking at 2010 census as applied to
2001 lines, whatever that number was. I tried to be as close to
that as possible"), 163 ("I tried to draw those districts as close to
the numbers as possible").
3~ Tr. v. 3 at 221.
37 Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, Doc. 196, at 73; see id. at 77 (plaintiffs failed to show new
minority district could be created "without lowering the minority
percentages in surrounding districts").
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the Voting Rights Act. The district court stated that
Dial, McClendon and Hinaman "understood that,
under the Voting Rights Act, the ... new majority-
black districts should reflect as closely as possible the
percentage of black voters in the existing majority-
black districts as of the 2010 Census." J.S.App. 32-
33. "Senator Dial, Representative McClendon, and
Hinaman understood ’retrogression’ under section 5
of the Voting Rights Act to mean ... a significant
reduction in the percentage of blacks in the new
[majority-black] districts as compared to the 2001
districts with the 2010 data." J.S.App. 33.38 That is
what Dial said he thought section 5 required the state
to do. "Q .... [W]as it your opinion that reducing the
black percentages in the majority-black districts
would violate the Voting Rights Act? A. Yes, sir.’’’~ A
decrease of even a single percent in the proportion of
the population that was black, Dial insisted, would
have been impermissible.4°
38 Dial testified that the Committee understood the Voting
Rights Act "to require that it not reduce ... the approximate
levels of black population within [the majority-black] districts."
J.S.App. 94.
39 Dial dep., APX 66 Doc. 125-3, at 39-40.
40 Dial dep., APX 66, at 81:
Q. So you did not want the population of African-
Americans to drop in [SD 23] ?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Okay. And if that population dropped a percentage,
in our opinion that would have been retrogression?
A. Yes, sir.
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Q .... [I]f that [black] population dropped a
percentage, in your opinion that would have
been retrogression?
A. That’s correct.
Q .... [I]f Senator Sanders’ district had been
65 percent African-American, and if it
dropped to 62 percent African-American in
total population, then that would have been
retrogression to you?
A. In my opinion, yes.
Q. And so that’s what you were trying to
prevent?
A. Yes.4’
In this Court the state insists that "the drafters of
Alabama’s plans interpreted Section Five to require
them to keep the percentages of minority voters
roughly constant in the majority-minority districts .... "
Joint Motion to Affirm, No. 13-1138, at 8. The draft-
ers’ insistence that section 5 required them to main-
tain the black population percentage in each of the
majority-black districts confirms that state officials
used race in precisely that manner.
Under the Legislature’s written Guidelines, that
mistaken interpretation of section 5 automatically
took priority over traditional districting principles.42
41 Id. at 81.
42 The Department of Justice section 5 guidance makes
clear that section 5 does not require a covered jurisdiction to
(Continued on following page)
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The Guidelines set out a number of such principles,
such as composing districts "of as few counties as
practicable," compactness, avoiding contests between
incumbents, not dividing precincts, and respecting
the integrity of communities of interest.43 But the
Guidelines expressly provided that "priority is to be
given to ... the Voting Rights Act .... "4~ The district
court pointed out that under the state’s own stan-
dards "the ’first qualification’ after meeting the
guideline of an overall deviation of 2 percent was not
to retrogress minority districts when repopulating
them." J.S.App. 149. "The guidelines acknowledged
that not all of the redistricting goals could always be
accomplished and provided that, in cases of conflict,
priority would be given to the requirement of one
person, one vote and to the requirements of the
Voting Rights Act." J.S.App. 27-28. In this Court the
state itself points out that "[t]he district court ...
expressly credited the testimony of the plan’s drafters
that, after one-person one-vote, their next highest
goal was to comply with the Voting Rights Act." Joint
mechanically override in this manner its traditional districting
criteria. Guidance Concerning Redistricting Under Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act, 76 Fed.Reg. 7470, 7471-72 (Feb. 9, 2011).
43 Doc. 30-4, at 3-4.
44 Id. at 4 ("In establishing congressional and legislative
districts, the Reapportionment Committee shall give due con-
sideration to all the criteria herein. However, priority is to be
given to the compelling state interests requiring equality of
population among districts and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as
amended, should the requirements of those criteria conflict with
any other criteria.").
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Motion to Affirm, No. 13-1138, at 5. In light of the
drafters’ erroneous insistence that the Voting Rights
Act mandated the maintenance of the black popula-
tion percentages at the same levels that existed in
majority-black districts under the 2001 lines after the
2010 census, adding enough blacks to each majority-
black district to replicate that black percentage neces-
sarily was in the framers’ view a requirement that
"could not be compromised." Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 907.
(2) The framers of the 2012 plan were commit-
ted to achieving the district-specific minimum racial
ratios "if possible." But when the additional popula-
tion available to repopulate an underpopulated dis-
trict did not have a sufficiently large black population
percentage to achieve that ratio, the framers had to
use whatever population was available to satisfy one
person, one vote.
The district court believed that this meant that
one person, one vote - not the racial ratios - was the
predominant motive under Shaw.
We agree with our dissenting colleague that
all districting principles were subordinated
to a single consideration, but our dissenting
colleague identifies the wrong one .... IT]he
consistent testimony of Senator Dial, Repre-
sentative McClendon, and Hinaman estab-
lished that the constitutional requirement of
one person, one vote trumped every other
districting principle .... While accomplishing
this primary task, Hinaman also tried to
satisfy sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights
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Act. Our dissenting colleague discounts
Hinaman’s paramount commitment to popu-
lation equality....
J.S.App. 151-52; see id. at 147-48.
But proof of a Shaw violation does not require a
demonstration that racial purpose would also have
predominated over complying with the constitutional
limitations on the permissible deviation in district
size. Shaw does not require a showing that the fram-
ers of a districting plan in order to achieve some
racial purpose had also violated, or at least would
have been willing to violate, the constitutional re-
quirement of one person, one vote. Shaw claims
usually arise in the context of districts that are
sufficiently similar in size that they present no sepa-
rate constitutional issue under Reynolds v. Sims.
Those who draft districting plans virtually always
begin with a commitment to crafting districts suffi-
ciently similar in size to be constitutional. If that
near universal priority were sufficient to defeat a
Shaw claim, Shaw would be a dead letter.
This Court found constitutional violations in
Hunt v. Cromartie, Bush v. Vera, and Shaw v. Hunt.
None of these cases presented proof that the framers
of the plan in question had violated one person, one
vote, or that they would have done so if necessary to
achieve the racial purpose in question. The legislative
guidelines adopted by Georgia in Miller "required
single-member districts of equal population." 515 U.S.
at 906. In Shaw H the state unsuccessfully argued
that race was not the predominant motivating factor
29
because the framers of the district in question also
had "an intention to meet one-person, one-vote re-
quirements.’’45 The dissenters in Easley did not sug-
gest there was any evidence in that case of a violation
of, or willingness to violate, the requirement of one
person, one vote. 532 U.S. at 259-66.
The Shaw requirement that a racial purpose
have predominated over traditional districting prin-
ciples refers to districting criteria other than a state’s
effort to comply with the constitutional principle of
population equality. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916
("compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdi-
visions or communities defined by actual shared
interests"); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 962 ("compact-
ness"); Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647 ("compactness, conti-
guity, and respect for political subdivisions").
C. The Subordination of Traditional Dis-
tricting Criteria
The drafters’ determination to maintain the
existing black percentage in all of the majority-black
districts meant that they had to achieve a different
minimum racial ratio in each district. That district-
specific minimum racial ratio varied from 50.61% in
HD 84 to several House and Senate districts above
70%.45 Insuring that as many districts as possible
4~ State Appellees’ Brief, Shaw v. Hunt, at 34, available at
1995 WL 632461.
46 APX 6; J.A. 103-06.
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were above these various district-specific racial ratios
was of controlling and pervasive importance in the
framing of the 2012 plan.
(1) The drafters implemented with painstak-
ing exactitude their determination to repopulate the
majority-black districts, where possible, so that the
black population percentage did not decrease.
Change in Black Population Percentage
2001 and 2012 Plans
Under 2010 Census47
District 2001 Plan 2012 Plan Difference
HD 55 73.55% 73.55% 0
HD 97 60.66% 60.66% 0
HD 56 62.13% 62.14% + .01%
HD 67 69.14% 69.15% + .01%
HD 52 60.11% 60.13% + .02%
HD 57 68.42% 68.47% + .05%
HD 69 64.16% 64.21% + .05%
HD 54 56.73% 56.83% + .10%
HD 53 55.70% 55.83% + .13%
HD 70 61.83% 62.03% + .20%
HD 60 67.41% 67.88% + .47%
HD 83 56.92% 57.52% + .60%
HD 32 59.34% 60.05% + .71%
47 These data are set out at pp. 13-14 of the Defendants’
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Doc. 196.
The percentage for HD 53 under the 2012 plan is in SDX 403, p.
5 col. 7.
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In almost half of the majority-black House districts,
the black population percentage changed less than
.75%; in a quarter of them it changed by less than .1%.
In every House district within this .71% range, the
black population percentage either went up or stayed
the same. There is virtually no change in the percent-
age in the district denoted House District 53, despite
the fact that the original HD 53 in Jefferson County
was abolished and replaced by an entirely new district,
with the same House District number, but located
some 100 miles away in Madison County. The black
population percentage also changed by less than 1% in
three of the eight majority-black Senate districts.48
This pattern is assuredly "unexplainable on
grounds other than race." Hunt v. Cromartie, 526
U.S. at 546 (quoting Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 644). In a
single case, or even several instances, the racial
composition of a new district might by chance be close
to or even the same as that of its predecessor, but
surely that could not occur by chance in such a large
number of districts in a single redistricting plan. The
state has never contended this was simply an ex-
traordinary coincidence. The pattern makes clear
that in each of these districts whatever traditional
districting factors might otherwise have influenced
the selection of areas to be added to a district were
set aside in favor of adhering to the applicable dis-
trict-specific minimum racial ratio.
48 SD 23 rose by .08%, SD 24 rose by .44%, and SD 18 fell by
.82%. Doc. 196 at 12.
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The dissenting judge below correctly remarked
upon the "racial exactitude" of the manner in which
those ratios were implemented. J.S.App. 230.
In some districts, the rigidity of these quotas
is on full display. HD 52 needed an addi-
tional 1,145 black people to meet the quota;
the drafters added an additional 1,143. In
other words, the drafters came within two
individuals of achieving the exact quota they
set for the black population; these two people
represent .004% of the district. In HD 55, the
drafters added 6,994 additional black resi-
dents, just 13 individuals more than the quo-
ta required, and in HD 56 they added 2,503
residents, just 12 individuals more than the
quota required, both out of a total population
of 45,071.
J.S.App. 208-09 (footnoted omitted).
In seven House districts4~ and three Senate
districts~° the black population percentage increased
more than one percent. That was entirely consistent
with the testimony of the drafters that they intended
to create black majorities "at least" as great as had
4~ HD 59 (+9.76%), HD 68 (+2.1%), HD 71 (+2.1%), HD 72
(+4.38%), HD 76 (+4.34%), HD 82 (+5.02%), and HD 84
(+1.73%). Brief Appendix, pp. 5a-6a.
50 SD 26 (+2.47%), SD 28 (+8.91%), and SD 33 (+6.82%).
Brief Appendix, p. 7a.
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existed under the 2001 plan after the 2010 census.
In at least one of those districts there is evidence that
the drafters systematically drew the lines to increase
the black population percentage. (See infra, pp. 51-
52). The district court commented that "the Legisla-
ture fairly balanced the overall percentages of the
black voting-age population in the majority-black
House districts" (J.S.App. 182) (emphasis added), so
that the districts in which the black percentage
increased balanced out the districts in which the
Legislature had been unable to achieve the racial
ratio. The comment suggests that the majority below
believed that the drafters had deliberately added
extra blacks to some districts to make up for the fact
that it had not been possible to move into other
majority-black districts enough blacks to achieve the
district-specific minimum racial ratio for those par-
ticular districts.
(2) Hinaman, Dial and McClendon all testified
that they had maintained the black population percen-
tage whenever possible. Under the state Guidelines, the
only criterion that was not subordinate to the Voting
Rights Act (as they interpreted it) was the require-
ment of one person, one vote. Hinaman explained
that sometimes when he needed to add population to
a majority-black district, the black population per-
centage of the district unavoidably declined because
~ J.S.App. 148 ("I did not consider any [black percentage]
too high, based on ... the fact that the districts had to grow
proportionately.") (quoting Senator Dial).
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the proportion of blacks in the areas adjacent to that
district was too low. "In some districts, it was obvi-
ously ... unavoidable because there was just not the
African-American population to enter those districts.
The black percentage was going to go down no matter
what. So there were certain areas where you couldn’t
help but lower the percentage.’’52 The only other
explanation Hinaman (or anyone else) gave for lower-
ing the black population percentage was to transfer
blacks from HD 19 into the newly created majority-
black HD 53.53 "Hinaman never testified that he
lowered the black percentage in any district for any
other reason." J.S.App. 229 (dissenting opinion). The
court below commented that the fact that the black
percentage declined in some majority-black districts
"supports the inference that Hinaman subordinated
racial considerations to the guideline of an overall
deviation in population of 2 percent." J.S.App. 150.
That observation necessarily reflects the fact that the
reason the district-specific minimum racial ratio was
~2 Hinaman dep., Doc. 134-4, APX 75, at 102; see tr. v. 3,
162-63:
Q .... [Y]ou ... lowered House District 98 from
65.22 to 65.2. And House District 103 as well, didn’t
you?
A. Sometimes there’s no way to avoid it.
~3 Tr. v. 3, 162
Q. Well, you lowered House District 19, which was
69.82 percent, to 61.25 percent. Correct?
A. Yes, I did, but for the greater good of creating an-
other African American majority district.
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not achieved in some cases was that the available
areas that could be used for the necessary repopula-
tion of underpopulated majority-black districts simply
did not have a large enough black population.
The district court commented that "[t]he legis-
lature reduced the percentage of black persons in
majority-black districts where necessary to achieve
other objectives." J.S.App. 144. But the court below
did not suggest that the "other objectives" included
anything except assuring that the districts were of
reasonably equal population, and in one instance
creating a new majority-black district.
The district court understood that in framing the
2012 plans the drafters had sought to replicate the
black population percentage that existed in the 2001
districts after the 2010 census.54 Dial,5~ McClendon,~ and
Hinaman~7 all explained that benchmark with which
they compared the new districts was the black popu-
lation under the 2010 census in the 2001 districts.
Hinaman emphasized that he never even looked at
what the black population had been in the 2001
districts under the 2000 census.~8 The state told the
district court the same thing, noting that the De-
partment of Justice benchmark - which it was seek-
ing to replicate - was the population under the 2010
54 J.S.App. 100, 103.
~5 Tr. v. 1, at 54.
56 Tr. v. 3, 221.
57 Tr. v. 3, 118,142,145.
~8 Doc. 134-4, APX 75, at 23-24.
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census in the old 2001 districts.59 The state’s post-trial
brief contained a table which compared the composi-
tion of the districts under the 2012 plan with the
composition of those districts under the 2001 plan
after the 2010 census.~°
However, in assessing the significance of the
2012 plan, the majority below relied on the wrong
table in the state’s proposed findings. The table set
out at p.47 of the Jurisdictional Statement Appendix
lists the population in the 2001 districts at the time
of the 2000 census, not after the 2010 census.~1 The
failure to distinguish between the percentages in
those districts under the 2010 census - which the
drafters had used as their benchmark - and the
different percentages under the 2000 census, led to a
series of problems. First, the majority opinion, relying
on that table, repeatedly states erroneously that the
2012 plan lowered the black population percentage
in 13 House districts and raised it in only 14.
J.S.App. 46, 159-60.62 In fact (compared to the popu-
lation under the 2010 census) the 2012 plan raised
~ Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, Doc. 196, at 11, 37.
6o Id. at 12-14.
61 The figures for the 2001 districts are in the fourth column
from the right.
62 In another passage the majority compared the black vot-
ing age population in the 2012 and 2001 districts under the 2010
population. J.S.App. 182. It is undisputed, however, that the
district-specific minimum racial ratios were based on total pop-
ulation, not voting age population.
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the black population percentage in 20 House districts
and lowered it in only 7.63 Second, apparently also
relying on this table, the majority rebukes the dis-
senting judge for "fail[ing] to mention that there are
5 majority-black House districts below 60 percent
under the new plan in contrast with only 2 majority-
black House districts below 60 percent under the
2001 plan .... " J.S.App. 160. In fact, under the 2001
plan after the 2010 census there were 6 majority-
black House districts (not 2) below 60%.64 The 2012
plan increased the black population percentage in all
of them, raising 2 to over 60%, and only created a
new fifth "majority-black" district under 60% by also
increasing the population in what had been a black
plurality district under the 2001 plan.6~ Third, the
majority criticized the dissenting judge for ignoring
the record of "many ... examples" in which the 2012
plan had reduced the black percentage of majority-
black districts. J.S.App. 154. But the court’s calcula-
tions utilize the data in the table at J.S.App. 47,
which is based on the wrong census. In fact, in 5 of
the 8 examples which follow this statement the black
~3 APX 6; J.A. 103-06.
6, Under the 2010 census HD 32, 53, 54, 82, 83, and 84 were
under 60% black. APX 6; J.A. 103-06.
6~ APX 6; J.A. 103-06. The 2012 plan raised to over 60% the
black populations in HD 32 and HD 82. HD 85 was changed
from a plurality-black district to a majority-black district.
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population percentage (as measured after the 2010
census) actually was increased by the 2012 plan.~
(3) The Legislature’s Guidelines expressly set
out as one of the "criteria for ... legislative ... districts"
"avoid[ing] when ever [sic] possible" putting two in-
cumbents in the same district.~7 That policy, the
Legislature explained was "embedded in the political
values, traditions, customs, and usages of the State of
Alabama."68 Protecting the core of each existing dis-
trict was also an avowed criterion for the redistricting
plan, in part because it protected existing com-
munities of interest, another criterion expressly man-
dated by the Legislature.69 Both of these traditional
districting principles were expressly sacrificed to the
Legislature’s higher goal of achieving the district-
specific minimum racial ratios. As the dissenting
judge below pointedly observed, "[i]n [two House
districts] the racial quotas trumped the stated goals
of both maintaining the core of districts and avoiding
conflicts between incumbents." J.S.App. 233.
~6 The 2012 plan increased the black population percentage
in HD 52, 53, 54, 83 and 97 (compared to their populations in
the 2001 districts under the 2010 census), all of which the ma-
jority described as having reduced black population percentages.
J.S.App. 154. The dissenting judge correctly noted that the 2012
plan had increased the black population percentage in those
districts. J.S.App. 208 n.16.
~7 Doc. 30-4, at 2-3 (capitalization omitted).
~s Id. at 3.
~’~ Id. at 3; J.S.App. 147.
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The state expressly agreed, and the district court
correctly found, that the majority-black HD 53 was
cannibalized so that the black population from that
district could be divided up among the surviving
majority-black House districts in Jefferson County, in
order to avoid any reduction in their black population
percentage. J.S.App. 38. The dismemberment of HD 53
enabled the state to keep five of those House districts
over 65% black, and three of them over 70% black.7°
The incumbent Representative in HD 53, Demetrius
Newton, the former Speaker pro tempore and one of
the longest serving black members of the Alabama
Legislature, was placed in the district of another
incumbent. Neither the core nor any other part of HD
53 survived; the district number was assigned to a
new district 100 miles away in Madison County.
The state expressly agreed, and the district court
correctly found, that HD 73 was also cannibalized for
the same reason. (Although the majority below refers
to HD 73 as "majority white," it actually had a black
plurality when it was cannibalized in 2012; see
J.S.App. 37 (majority opinion), 200 n.10 (dissenting
opinion)). The black population which had once been
part of that district was divided up among majority-
black House districts in Montgomery County in order
to avoid any reduction in their black population per-
centages. J.S.App. 36-37. The incumbent representa-
tive from HD 73 was placed in the district of another
~o SDX 403.
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incumbent. Neither the core nor any other part of HD
73 survived; that district number was assigned to a
new, overwhelmingly white district 75 miles away in
Shelby County.
The black populations culled from these two dis-
tricts were used to try to meet the district-specific
minimum racial ratios in 8 Jefferson County majority-
black districts and 3 Montgomery County majority-
black districts; the cannibalization of HD 53 and HD
73 thus accounts for about 40% of the majority-black
districts whose ratios were maintained.
The majority below commented that "Hinaman
avoided all incumbency conflicts in the Senate and
permitted only two conflicts in the House." J.S.App.
160; see id. at 57 ("only" two conflicts between incum-
bents). But the "only" highlights the significance of
the undisputed facts; avoiding conflicts was a fun-
damental standard for the redistricting, which was
never sacrificed except when doing so was necessary
to satisfy the district-specific minimum racial ratios.
Elsewhere the court explained that "Hinaman avoided,
as much as possible, the placement of more than
one incumbent in each district ... [a]nd ... to pre-
serve communities of interest, Hinaman preserved, as
much as possible, the core of each existing district."
J.S.App. 147. But again, the qualification "as much as
possible" acknowledges that protecting these tra-
ditional districting principles was not "possible" if
they conflicted with the district-specific minimum
racial ratios. The court dismissed the dismemberment
of these two districts on the ground that "neither
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of those House conflicts remains because afterward
Representative Newton [from HD 53] died and Rep-
resentative Hubbard [from HD 73] moved his resi-
dence." J.S.App. 160. But the drafters’ insistence on
putting these incumbents in the districts of other rep-
resentatives is important, not because of the injury to
the political careers of Newton and Hubbard, but be-
cause it is a glaring example of the subordination of
traditional districting principles to the maintenance
of the district-specific minimum racial ratios.
(4) Avoiding the division of counties is a dis-
tricting principle of constitutional significance in
Alabama. That principle is embedded in the state
Constitution; section 200, for example, provides that
"No county shall be divided between two [Senate]
districts .... " Legislative districting plans have been
invalidated for violating these whole-county require-
ments. Burton v. Hobbie, 591 F.Supp. 1029, 1035
(M.D. Ala. 1983) ("we find that Act No. 82-629 is
impermissible under Ala.Const. art. IX §§ 198, 199 &
200 because of its disregard for the integrity of county
lines. Boundaries of thirty counties were unnecessari-
ly split by the plan."). The Guidelines adopted by the
Legislature for the 2012 redistricting provided that
"[e]ach House and Senate district should be composed
of as few counties as practicable.’’71 Those Guidelines
also provided that county boundaries by definition
delineated a "community of interest" which should be
71 Doc. 30-4, at 3.
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respected.72 During the public hearings that preceded
the adoption of the 2012 plan, the most widely ex-
pressed concern of local officials and voters was to
maintain county lines and to minimize the number of
districts that crossed county lines.73
Minimizing the number of districts that cross
county lines is uniquely important in Alabama be-
cause of its unusual impact on control of individual
counties. Alabama does not have the county home
rule that prevails in at least most of the country. The
Alabama Constitution contains no general grant of
authority to county officials; rather, the state Consti-
tution empowers the counties themselves to act only
in a number of limited ways. Many of the issues
affecting only a specific county are outside the au-
thority of county officials, and must instead be dealt
with by the state Legislature.TM Each year the legisla-
ture adopts a large number of measures which affect
only a single county, making many of the decisions
that almost anywhere else would be handled at the
local level.
For decades the Alabama Legislature has fash-
ioned these county-specific measures through an
informal local delegation system. As a general matter,
the Legislature will approve any county-specific pro-
posal sponsored by the legislative delegation from
72 Id. at 3-4.
73 J.S.App. 30-31, 44; NPX 323, par. 117.
74 J.S.App. 341-42, 428-29.
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that particular county. Depending on the size of a
county’s delegation, agreement on such measures
may by tradition require approval of a majority of the
delegation, or in some instances unanimity. J.S.App.
342-46 (dissenting opinion). For all practical pur-
poses, the legislative delegation for a particular
county wields most of the powers that in at least most
states would be held by a county council or commis-
sion.
Under the local delegation custom, the delegation
which controls legislation for a particular county is
composed of every member of the House or Senate
whose district includes even a small portion of that
county. Thus the county delegation can and often does
include state legislators most of whose districts lie
outside the county in question; those legislators may
wield the decisive votes when there is a disagreement
among the legislators whose districts lie wholly
within the county in question, or when unanimity
is required. Whenever a district crosses county lines,
it places the legislator involved on the legislative
delegations for multiple counties. County residents
understandably may object to additional line-crossing
districts, because those districts can reduce the
amount of control which county voters have over the
legislative delegation that largely determines what
county-specific measures will be enacted by the
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Legislature.7~ See J.S.App. 367-75 (dissenting opin-
ion).
The framers of the 2012 plan repeatedly
acknowledged that achieving the district-specific
minimum racial ratios required them to fashion dis-
tricts that crossed county lines. Senator Dial ex-
plained that "we adopted the guidelines to keep
counties intact as much as possible, but when you
apply the Voting Rights Act on top of all that, it
makes it almost impossible to keep all counties
[intact].’’7~ Thus when "[Senator] Singleton[ ] ... had to
have more minorities ... he grew into Lamar [Coun-
ty].’’77 Hinaman agreed that "there would be county
splits potentially based on the Voting Rights Act
and not retrogressing a Majority/Minority district.’’~8
For example, "House District 69 was ... an African-
American Majority district ... [and] was short popu-
lation and I needed to bring it into Montgomery
County.’’~9 Satisfying the district-specific minimum
7~ Smitherman testimony, tr. v. 2, at 13 ("we’re at the mercy
of the suburbs and the surrounding other counties"). At one
public hearing, Representative McClendon, speaking as a
representative of his home county, not as a co-chair of the
Reapportionment Committee, said that placing in his county
delegation many legislators who reside in other counties "affects
accountability [and] is not right." J.S.App. 374-75 (quoting Doc.
30-26, at 7).
76 Tr., v. 1, at 91.
77 Id. at 48.
78 Hinaman dep., APX 75, Doc. 134-4, at 34.
79 Id. at 94.
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racial ratio repeatedly led to crossing county lines
when the required additional black population was
in another county. Even within a county, the awk-
ward manner in which that ratio was satisfied could
force another district to straddle a county boundary.
The elimination of HD 53 in Jefferson County trig-
gered a series of changes which resulted in two
additional districts (both majority white) located
partly in that county and partly in suburban coun-
ties.s° There was repeated testimony that complying
with the ratio in one county had led to dividing coun-
ties among other districts several counties away.sl
The 1% deviation rule rendered the entire districting
scheme more rigid, so that the gerrymandering of
one district would affect any number of others "like
dominos."s2
~° Compare SDX 412 (2001) (HD 34, 43, 45, 48) with SDX
404 (2012) (HD 14, 15, 16, 43, 45, 48). Under the 2001 House
plan there were 13 Jefferson county districts that were located
wholly within the county. If that number had remained the same
under the 2012 plan, there would have been 66,460 leftover
individuals who had to be divided among districts that extended
outside of the county. The elimination of HD 53 meant that there
were 111,981 such persons.
~1 Tr. v. 1 at 48-49, 114; Dial affidavit, APX 66, at ~]~I 84, 87;
Dial dep., APX 66, Doc. 125-3 at 51-52; Hinaman dep., APX 75 at
53-55.
s2 Hinaman testimony, tr. v. 3, at 69, 123-24; see J.S.App. 62,
97-98 ("domino effect"); tr. v. 1, at 108 ("it’s all like dominos, and
... one thing affects the other."); Hinaman dep., APX 75, Doc.
134-4 at 53-54.
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The district court majority simply did not discuss
the undisputed testimony that satisfying the district-
specific minimum racial ratio had indeed led to
splitting counties among multiple districts. That
subordination to racial considerations of the state
constitutional principal of respecting county lines is
precisely what is important under Shaw.
(5) The Legislature’s Guidelines provided that
precinct boundaries should be respected because pre-
cincts constituted "a community of interest" that
should be respected, reflecting a policy embedded in
Alabama tradition.83 The district court found that
"[w]hen necessary to avoid retrogression, Hinaman
split precincts at the census block level." J.S.App.
104. Hinaman was quite explicit about his practice of
dividing precincts along racial lines in order to com-
ply with the district-specific minimum racial ratio.
Q. And if [a] precinct did not increase the
black percentage, or at least it didn’t in-
crease it as much as you wanted, you would
simply split the precincts and go down to the
block level and look for a majority black
block or several blocks.
A. Well, that’s a little bit of a simplification.
I mean, I tried to look at the addi[ ]tions en
masse, not just a precinct. I might add a ...
majority white precinct and a majority Afri-
can American precinct; but if you look at the
8,~ Doc. 30-4, at 3-4.
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end number, it did not retrogress the overall
end number for that precinct, then they were
added in. If for some reason they retro-
gressed that number, then, yes. So I would
split precincts.
Q. And when you split precincts, you would
have to go to the block level?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And could you see - you could see on the
screen, couldn’t you, which blocks on your
screen had black populations of substantial
numbers, right?
A. Certainly.84
The record contains substantial evidence document-
ing specific instances in which particular precincts
were divided on the basis of race, with the black
portions going to a majority-black district while the
white areas were made part of an adjacent majority-
white district.8~ The only information that Hinaman
had below the precinct level was the racial composi-
tion of individual census blocks. J.S.App. 203-05.
The majority below reasoned that "even where it
occurred, precinct splitting was less of an evil to be
avoided in redistricting than the subordination of
other redistricting criteria, such as compliance with
s4 Tr. v. 3, at 143; see APX 75, Hinaman dep., at 117-18.
85 Hinaman, tr. v. 3 at 142-44, 178-79, 185-86; Hinaman
dep., at 111-14, 117-18.
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... the Voting Rights Act." J.S.App. 159. That state-
ment acknowledges that precincts were being divided
along racial lines to satisfy what the drafters mistak-
enly insisted was a requirement of the Voting Rights
Act.
The majority also suggested that the acknowl-
edged race-based precinct splitting was not legally
significant because other precincts, perhaps more of
them, might have been split to satisfy the 1% devia-
tion rule.86 "Our dissenting colleague does not cite ...
evidence for support of his assertion that majority-
black districts suffered the brunt of the precinct
splits .... " Id. "Taken as a whole, Hinaman’s testimony
confirms that race was not the predominant motivat-
ing factor in precinct splitting." J.S.App. 159. Whether
most precinct splitting occurred for non-racial rea-
sons might be relevant in a case where a plaintiff
claimed that a pervasive pattern of precinct splitting
along racial lines constituted circumstantial evi-
dence that a district had been constructed with a
racial purpose. Here, however, the drafters’ racial
purpose was undisputed; the evidence of race-based
precinct splitting was significant only as confirmation
that the drafters had indeed subordinated the integ-
rity of precincts to achieving the district-specific
minimum racial ratio, as their avowed purpose indi-
cated they would. The issue here is whether achiev-
ing that racial ratio was the predominant motive in
~o But see J.S.App. 156 (House plan split 57% of majority-
black precincts but only 39% of majority-white precincts).
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constructing the majority-black districts, not whether
- as the court below seemed to believe - race rather
than the 1% deviation rule was most frequently the
reason that precincts were divided.
(6) The 2012 plan managed to add to SD 26 a
total of 14,806 blacks but only 36 whites. The racial
machinations needed to achieve that were particu-
larly complex.
Under the 2001 plan after the 2010 census, SD 26
was underpopulated by 11.64%, 15,898 people.87 The
population of SD 26 was 72.75% black. J.S.App. 48. SD
26 occupied most of Montgomery County, including the
entire southern half of the county.8~ Immediately to the
south of SD 26 was Crenshaw County, with a popula-
tion of 13,906.s9 Because of unrelated changes in the
districting scheme, Crenshaw County was no longer
part of any Senate district.9° So the obvious solution to
both problems was to add Crenshaw County to the
adjoining SD 26, a step that would have largely solved
the underpopulation problem in SD 26. But Crenshaw
was only 23.39% black; adding it to SD 26 would have
reduced SD 26 from 72.75% to 67.15% black.91
Hinaman explained that he was unwilling to add
87 SDX 402.
88 J.A. 192;APX 37.
89 NPX 328, at 1.
9o See tr. v. 3, at 123, 125.
91 The resulting district would have had a population of
134,572, of whom 91,039 would have been black.
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Crenshaw County to SD 26, because doing so would
reduce the black percentage of the population in that
district. At trial Hinaman acknowledged that if all the
population added to SD 26 had been white, it still
would have been overwhelmingly black; but that
simply was not good enough.92
So the drafters rejected adding Crenshaw County
to SD 26, and looked for another solution. They
decided to add Crenshaw County to SD 25, a 71%
white district. But SD 25 was located in the northern
part of Montgomery County, and parts of another
county even further to the north. SD 25 did not adjoin
Crenshaw County, and the portion of SD 25 nearest
to Crenshaw County was over 20 miles away, with
SD 26 in between. So to connect Crenshaw County to
SD 25, the framers created what Hinaman described
as a "land bridge"- through part of the old SD 26 -
between SD 25 and Crenshaw County. See J.S.App.
172. By adding 13,906 mostly white people from
Crenshaw County to SD 25, it was then possible to
transfer an equal number of people from predominant-
ly black portions of SD 25 in Montgomery County to
SD 26. Indeed, the drafters had to cancel out the
addition of the Crenshaw County population to SD 25,
because SD 25 was already slightly overpopulated.’~3
9~ Tr. v. 3, at 179.
93 Under the 2012 plan 13,906 persons were added to SD 25
from Crenshaw County, and a net total of 15,785 persons were
added to SD 26 from SD 25. That meant that SD 25 lost a net of
1,879 persons from the population it had prior to the addition of
(Continued on following page)
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Attaching Crenshaw County to SD 25 could not result
in a net increase in the SD 25 population without
violating one person, one vote; demographically, the
land bridge had to be a land bridge to nowhere.
But doing that alone could not have repopulated
SD 26 with a virtually all-black group. There assur-
edly was not a portion of SD 25 that contained 14,806
blacks but only 36 whites. The only way to achieve
that exceptional result was to swap predominantly
white areas in SD 26 for predominantly black areas
of SD 25; the net effect of such an exchange could be
to add only blacks to SD 26. In terms of traditional
districting principles that made no sense; one does
not repopulate an underpopulated district by remov-
ing people. But that is precisely what Hinaman did.
He transferred from underpopulated SD 26 to over-
populated SD 25 the southwest quarter of Montgom-
ery County, an area in the northwest corner of the
county, and a portion of the center of the county.94
The incumbent Senator in SD 26 explained that the
new boundary between SD 25 and SD 26 was drawn
Crenshaw and transfer of population to SD 26. After all of this,
SD 25 had a population of 135,492; so before these changes, the
SD 25 population (partly in Montgomery County and partly in
Elmore County) was 137,361. The ideal Senate district size
under the 2010 census was 136,563.
94 Compare APX 37 with APX 39; compare J.A. 191 with
J.A. 192.
52
along racial lines;9~ Hinaman offered no non-racial
explanation for removing these areas from underpop-
ulated SD 26. By then replacing predominantly white
portions of SD 26 with predominantly black areas
from SD 25, the black population in SD 26 was in-
creased from 72.75% to 75.22%, to a level higher than
any other Senate district. The resulting SD 26 is a
strangely shaped configuration that resembles a
downward-facing sand fiddler crabY
The district court acknowledged "race was a fac-
tor in the drawing of District 26," noting that
Hinaman was seeking "to maintain roughly the same
black percentage of the total population [in SD 26]"
(J.S.App. 152), and that the Legislature "preserved ...
the percentage of the population that was black."
J.S.App. 172. The court describes Hinaman as having
transferred a portion of Montgomery County "from
District 26 to create a land bridge between the former
9~ J.S.App. 202:
[Senator] Ross stated that, despite the under-
population of his district, the new plan actually split
precincts that were already part of SD 26, moving
white portions of those precincts out of his district
while retaining only the black portions; in other
words, despite needing a huge number of new resi-
dents [in SD 26], Hinaman removed white residents
already living in SD 26 .... By taking these various
steps to remove white residents and add black ones,
the drafters achieved and even exceeded their quota of
72.75% black for the district.
(Emphasis in original).
96 APX 39; J.A. 197.
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area of District 25 and Crenshaw County" (J.S.App.
172), without mentioning Hinaman’s acknowledg-
ment that he had connected Crenshaw County to SD
25 rather than to SD 26 in order to avoid reducing the
black population percentage in SD 26. The court
argued that the dismemberment of SD 26 at least
"preserved the core of the existing District" (J.S.App.
172); but it never attempted to explain why (other
than for the land bridge) the framers would have
removed any areas at all from the underpopulated SD
26. The court explained that Hinaman had added to
SD 26 "populous precincts in the City of Montgomery
which shared many characteristics with other areas
of District 26." J.S.App. 172. But Hinaman never
referred to any "characteristics" shared by SD 26 and
the portions of SD 25 that were added to it; Hinaman
was just "going by the numbers," and the only num-
ber that mattered to him about the areas added to SD
26 was the number of black people who lived there.
The court notes that the areas transferred from SD
25 to SD 26 "included both black and white persons"
(J.S.App. 172); but Hinaman was perfectly clear that
he selected those areas precisely because - unlike
Crenshaw County - they included far more blacks
than whites.
(7) There are no material factual disputes about
the manner in which the state achieved the district-
specific minimum racial ratios in this case. When
achieving those ratios conflicted with the Legislature-
endorsed tradition that incumbents should not be
placed in the same district, that tradition was
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disregarded. When implementing the ratios was
inconsistent with the principle that existing districts
should be preserved, the districts were cannibalized.
When the ratios could not be created without dis-
regarding the whole-county provisions of the state
Constitution and the legislative Guideline against
splitting counties and precincts, the counties and
precincts were divided. When the ratios required that
people actually be taken out of underpopulated dis-
tricts, they were removed. The district court’s asser-
tion that none of this pattern of activity should be
characterized as "subordinating" traditional district-
ing principles to the drafters’ professed racial purpose
reflects, not any factual disagreement, but merely an
insistence by that court in using the term "subordina-
tion" in a highly idiosyncratic manner inconsistent
with the legal standard in Shaw and its progeny.
II. THE RACE-BASED DISTRICTING WAS NOT
JUSTIFIED BY A COMPELLING GOVERN-
MENTAL INTEREST
Because race was the predominant motivating
factor in the redrawing of the majority-black districts,
the state must establish that the redistricting plan
satisfied strict scrutiny. To do so, Alabama must
demonstrate that its districting legislation is naro
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. The
state contends that the manner in which those dis-
tricts were fashioned was required by section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act. We agree that Alabama may seek
to justify its 2012 plan as necessary to comply with
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section 5, despite this Court’s intervening decision in
Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013).
But section 5 neither required nor sanctioned the
unusual race-based scheme used to create that plan.
"A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly
tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the
State went beyond what was reasonably necessary to
avoid retrogression." Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 655. A
mistaken belief as to the meaning of section 5 does
not constitute a compelling interest. Miller v. John-
son, 515 U.S. at 922-23. Alabama’s actions must have
been "required by a correct reading of § 5." Shaw II,
517 U.S. at 911. The district court concluded that
section 5 establishes a per se rule, requiring a covered
jurisdiction whenever possible to maintain the level
of the minority population percentage in every major-
ity-minority district, regardless of how high that
percentage might be and without consideration of any
other relevant circumstances. J.S.App. 180-81. That
interpretation "was woefully incorrect." J.S.App. 247
(dissenting opinion).
Section 5(b) provides that a covered jurisdiction
may not enforce a voting standard that "will have the
effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens of the
United States on account of race ... to elect their
preferred candidates of choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b).
That language cannot fairly be read to require a cov-
ered jurisdiction to permanently maintain the minor-
ity population percentage in every district. Some
population percentages would be so high that a re-
duction would not realistically diminish the ability of
56
the protected group to elect the candidates of its
choice. If a districting plan reduced some group from
100% of a district to 90%, it would be very odd to say
that the legislation had diminished the ability of that
group to elect candidates of its choice. At some popu-
lation level - the figure would of course vary with any
number of circumstances - the ability of a protected
group to elect the candidates of its choice would be so
obvious that changes (up or down) above that level
would be of no practical importance.
The statutory language requires an evaluation of
the effect of a redistricting plan on the ability of
citizens to elect not just one candidate, but the candi-
dates - plural - of their choice. The redistricting
steps taken to maintain the minority population
percentage in one district might require reduction
of the percentage of that population in another dis-
trict; section 5 obviously cannot mean that the minor-
ity population must be unchanged in both districts.97
97 Senator Dial insisted that section 5, as he interpreted it,
had forced the state to eliminate most of the districts that were
30-50% black, in order to maintain the racial ratios in the
majority-black districts. Tr. v. 1, at 61.
Q. So what you’re saying Senator, is that in pursu-
ing your overriding goal of maintaining the large
black majorities in the majority black districts, if that
resulted in blacks being taken out of the majority
white districts, diluting their influence in those major-
ity white districts, that was just collateral damage?
That was just an accident or the result you get be-
cause of pursuing the Voting Rights Act?
A. That was because of the Voting Rights Act.
(Continued on following page)
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Cannibalizing districts reduces the number of candi-
dates of choice which a group can elect; the plan in
this case preserved the black population percentage in
eight Jefferson County districts by eliminating entire-
ly the ability of blacks in that county to elect a ninth
Representative of their choice. In that sense the plan
diminished, rather than protected, the ability of
blacks to elect the candidates of their choice.
Interpreting section 5 to bar in all circumstances
any reduction in the black population percentage of a
district would have peculiar consequences.
On the majority’s view, if a district is 99%
black, the legislature is prohibited by federal
law from reducing the black population to a
mere 98%. Read in this way, § 5 would be-
come a one-way ratchet: the black population
of a district could go up, either through de-
mographic shifts or redistricting plans (like
this one) that raise the percentage of black
people in some majority-black districts. But
the legislature could never lower the black
percentage, at least so long as it was "feasi-
ble" to avoid it.
J.S.App. 263 (dissenting opinion).
Section 5(b) was adopted in part to overturn this
Court’s decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461
Q. So we can blame the Voting Rights Act for the
loss of black influence in the majority white districts?
A. Absolutely.
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(2003), that section 5 permits a jurisdiction to replace
a district in which minority voters can elect the
candidates of their choice with districts in which they
would have instead the ability to "influence" the
political process. 539 U.S. at 482. Congress sought to
codify the different interpretation of section 5 in Jus-
tice Souter’s dissenting opinion. Justice Souter noted
that every member of the Court agreed that section 5
did not invariably require a covered jurisdiction to
freeze the level of the minority population in a dis-
trict. "The District Court began with the acknowl-
edgment (to which we would all assent) that the
simple fact of a decrease in black voting age popula-
tion ... in some districts is not alone dispositive
about whether a proposed plan is retrogressive."
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 498 (Souter, J., dis-
senting); see id. at 504-05 (Souter, J., dissenting)
("nonretrogression does not necessarily require main-
tenance of existing supermajority minority districts").
Senator Leahy, the original and lead sponsor of the
legislation, expressly endorsed that interpretation of
section 5, noting that it was consistent with earlier
precedent.98 Although, as the district court noted, the
98 152 Cong. Rec. S 7949-05 (2006) ("The amendment to
Section 5 does not ... freeze into place the current minority
voter percentages in any given district. As stated by the dissent-
ers in Georgia v. Ashcroft, as well as by Professor Arrington and
Professor Persily at the Committee hearings, reducing the
number of minorities in a district is perfectly consistent with the
pre-Ashcroft understanding of Section 5 as long as other factors
demonstrate that minorities retain their ability to elect their
preferred candidates.").
59
2006 legislation that added section 5(b) was intended
in certain respects to establish a more stringent
section 5 standard, that difference is not relevant
here. Congress intended only to restore, not to alter,
the pre-Georgia v. Ashcroft rule that forbad retrogres-
sion in the ability of a protected minority to elect
candidates of its choice.
The Department of Justice, which administers
section 5, has consistently9~ maintained - and advised
covered jurisdictions - that whether a districting plan
is retrogressive does not turn solely on the population
of the district. "In determining whether the ability to
elect exists in the benchmark plan and whether it
continues in the proposed plan, the Attorney General
does not rely on any predetermined or fixed demo-
graphic percentages at any point in the assessment ....
[C]ensus data alone may not provide sufficient
indicia of electoral behavior to make the requisite
determination." Guidance Concerning Redistricting
Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 76 Fed.Reg.
7470, 7471 (Feb. 9, 2011). The Department considers
among other things "whether minorities are
overconcentrated in one or more districts," a factor
which necessarily recognizes that a minority popula-
tion percentage above some level would have the
effect of reducing overall minority voting strength. Id.
at 7472; see 52 Fed.Reg. 486 (Jan. 6, 1987); 28 C.F.R.
§ 51.59(d).
99 The Department interpreted section 5 in the same
manner in 2001.66 Fed.Reg. 5412, 5413 (Jan. 18, 2001).
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The Department has specifically pointed to
actual election results as important to understanding
whether a redistricting plan would reduce the ability
of members of a protected group to elect the candi-
dates of their choice. "[T]his determination requires a
functional analysis of the electoral behavior within
the particular jurisdiction or election district." 76
Fed.Reg. at 7471. In determining the population level
at which minorities have the ability to elect candi-
dates of their choice, a page of election history may be
worth a volume of predictions. "[T]here are communi-
ties in which minority citizens are able to form coali-
tions with voters from other racial and ethnic groups,
having no need to be a majority within a single dis-
trict in order to elect candidates of their choice."
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (2000).
Of course the assessment of election data, as any
other information, may require complex judgments;
the election of a single candidate supported by the
minority community may prove little.
The court below suggested that "the best evi-
dence available" as to what should be done to comply
with section 5 was to be found in the actions of the
Democratic controlled 2001 Legislature, which the
district court insisted had deliberately "maintained’’1°°
the black population percentages in each of the
majority-black districts, "by adding similar percent-
ages of black voters to those districts." J.S.App. 184.
As we explained above, however, the Legislature in
1® J.S.App. 4, 6-7, 20, 22, 147, 151, 161-62.
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2001 actually did the opposite, reducing the black
population percentages in almost all those House
and Senate districts. (See p. 3, supra; Brief Appendix,
pp. 8a-10a). Even if that were not the case, the redis-
tricting plan of a particular state throws no light on
the meaning of the statute.
This emphatically is not a case in which a state
made a deliberate and informed assessment of the
population level at which minority voters in a partic-
ular district would be able to elect the candidates of
their choice. Hinaman consistently stressed that he
never considered anything - past election results,
voter participation rates, or other studies - except the
black population percentage under the 2001 lines
101
after the 2010 census.
What this Court said in Bartlett v. Strickland,
556 U.S. 1 (2008), about section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act is equally applicable to section 5. "It would be an
irony ... if [the provision] were interpreted to entrench
racial differences by expanding a ’statute meant to
hasten the waning of racism in American politics.’"
556 U.S. at 25 (quoting De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1020)
(plurality opinion). As Judge Thompson eloquently
emphasized in his dissenting opinion, "[t]he purpose
of the [Voting Rights Act] is to help minority groups
achieve equality, not to lock them into legislative
ghettos." J.S.App. 262.
1ol Tr. v. 3, at 148-9; Hinaman dep., APX 75, Doc. 134-4, at
139, 147.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the decision of the district
court should be reversed.
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STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction there-
of, are citizens of the United States and of
the state wherein they reside. No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as
amended, 42 U.S.C., provides:
(a) Whenever a State or political sub-
division with respect to which the prohibi-
tions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title
based upon determinations made under the
first sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title
are in effect shall enact or seek to administer
any voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
with respect to voting different from that in
force or effect on November 1, 1964, or when-
ever a State or political subdivision with re-
spect to which the prohibitions set forth in
section 1973b(a) of this title based upon de-
terminations made under the second sen-
tence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in
effect shall enact or seek to administer any
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
2a
or standard, practice, or procedure with re-
spect to voting different from that in force or
effect on November 1, 1968, or whenever a
State or political subdivision with respect to
which the prohibitions set forth in section
1973b(a) of this title based upon determina-
tions made under the third sentence of sec-
tion 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall
enact or seek to administer any voting quali-
fication or prerequisite to voting, or stan-
dard, practice, or procedure with respect to
voting different from that in force or effect on
November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision
may institute an action in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia
for a declaratory judgment that such qualifi-
cation, prerequisite, standard, practice, or
procedure neither has the purpose nor will
have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color, or in
contravention of the guarantees set forth in
section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, and unless
and until the court enters such judgment no
person shall be denied the right to vote for
failure to comply with such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or proce-
dure: Provided, That such qualification, pre-
requisite, standard, practice, or procedure
may be enforced without such proceeding
if the qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice, or procedure has been submitted by
the chief legal officer or other appropriate of-
ficial of such State or subdivision to the At-
torney General and the Attorney General has
not interposed an objection within sixty days
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after such submission, or upon good cause
shown, to facilitate an expedited approval
within sixty days after such submission, the
Attorney General has affirmatively indicated
that such objection will not be made. Neither
an affirmative indication by the Attorney
General that no objection will be made, nor
the Attorney General’s failure to object, nor a
declaratory judgment entered under this sec-
tion shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin
enforcement of such qualification, prerequi-
site, standard, practice, or procedure. In the
event the Attorney General affirmatively in-
dicates that no objection will be made within
the sixty-day period following receipt of a
submission, the Attorney General may re-
serve the right to reexamine the submission
if additional information comes to his atten-
tion during the remainder of the sixty-day
period which would otherwise require objec-
tion in accordance with this section. Any ac-
tion under this section shall be heard and
determined by a court of three judges in ac-
cordance with the provisions of section 2284
of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Su-
preme Court.
(b) Any voting qualification or prereq-
uisite to voting, or standard, practice, or pro-
cedure with respect to voting that has the
purpose of or will have the effect of diminish-
ing the ability of any citizens of the United
States on account of race or color, or in con-
travention of the guarantees set forth in sec-
tion 1973b(f)(2) of this title, to elect their
preferred candidates of choice denies or
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abridges the right to vote within the mean-
ing of subsection (a) of this section.
(c) The term "purpose" in subsections
(a) and (b) of this section shall include any
discriminatory purpose.
(d) The purpose of subsection (b) of this
section is to protect the ability of such citi-
zens to elect their preferred candidates of
choice.
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2001 and 2012 Plans Under 2010 Census
Majority-Black House Districts
District
19
32
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
2001 Plan
69.82%
59.34%
60.11%
55.71%
56.73%
73.55%
62.13%
68.42%
77.86%
2010 Plan
61.25%
60.05%
60.13%
55.83%
56.83%
73.55%
62.14%
68.47%
72.76%
Difference
-8.57%
+.71%
+.02%
+.12%
+.10%
+.01%
+.05%
-5.10%
+9.69%59 67.03% 76.72%
60 67.41% 67.88% +.47%
67 69.14% 69.15% +.01%
68 62.55% 64.56% +2.01%
69 64.16% 64.21% +.05%
70 61.83% 62.03% +.20%
71 64.28% 66.9% +2.6%
72 60.12% 64.5% +4.4%
76 69.54% 73.79% +4.25%
77 73.52% 67.04% -6.48%
78 74.26% 69.99% -4.27%
82 57.13% 62.14% +5.01%
83 56.92% 57.52% +.60%
84 50.61% 52.34% +1.73%
6a
97 60.66% 60.66% 0
98 65.22% 60.02% -5.20%
99 73.35% 65.61% -7.74%
103 69.84% 65.06% -4.78%
Source: Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, Doc. 196, at 13-14; SDX 403 at
p.5 col. 7; APX 6
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2001 and 2012 Plan Under 2010 Census
Majority-Black Senate Districts
2001 Plan 2012 Plan
18 59.92% 59.10%
19 71.59% 65.31%
20 77.82% 63.15%
23 64.76% 64.84%
District
24
26
28
33
62.78%
72.69%
50.98%
64.85%
63.22%
75.13%
59.83%
71.64%
Difference
-.82%
-6.28%
-14.67%
+.08%
+.44%
+2.44%
+8.85%
+6.79%
Source: Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, Doc. 196, at 12.
8a
1993 and 2001 Plans Under 2000 Census
Majority-Black House Districts
District 1993 Plan 2001 Plan ~Difference
19 78.565% 66.039%
32 63.490% 59.598%
52 73.870% 65.848%
53 65.298% 64.445%
54
-12.526%
-3.892%
-8.022%
-.853%
63.061% 63.276% +.215%
55 76.270% 67.772% -8.498%
56 70.268% 62.665% -7.603%
57 82.615% 62.967%
-19.648%
58 74.163% 63.518% -10.645%
59 66.255% 63.241%
60
67
68
69
7O
74.876%
71.032%
62.938%
64.855%
75.603%
67.736%
64.652%
76.527%
64.348%
63.447%
62.211%
65.308%
62.827%
64.191%
60.748%
73.309%
71
72
76
-3.014%
-10.528%
-7.585%
-.727%
+.453%
-12.776%
-3.545%
3.904%
-3.218%
77 74.802% 69.677% -5.125%
78 68.874% 72.697% +3.823%
82 78.826% 62.663%
-16.163%
9a
83 60.782% 61.214% +.432%
85 53.312% 47.863% -5.449%
97 67.243% 64.738% -2.505%
98 69.401% 64.448% -4.953%
99 74.916% 65.250% -9.666%
103 75.299% 63.049% -12.250%
Source: J.S.App. 47, col. 4 and SDX 419
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1993 and 2001 Plans Under 2000 Census
Majority-Black Senate Districts
District 1993 Plan 2001 Plan Difference
18 67.588% 66.685% -.903%
19 76.452% 66.227% -10.225%
20 71.829% 65.697%
-6.132%
23 66.081% 62.305% -3.776%
24 68.964% 62.409%
-6.555%
26 73.485% 71.507% -1.978%
28 59.269% 56.458% -2.811%
33 70.483% 62.451% -8.032%
Source: J.S.App. 48 col. 4 and SDX 416
